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From 2011 to 2017, the crew onboard the International Space Station (ISS) was at risk of 
dire consequences due to an external ammonia leak. Ammonia is used in the External Active 
Thermal Control System (EATCS) to cool the pressurized modules and external electrical 
systems. Engineers at NASA’s Johnson Space Center (JSC) initially detected the leak in one 
of two cooling loops by monitoring the system ammonia inventory decay over time. White 
flakes seen on High Definition (HD) cameras were also thought to be associated with the 
leakage but not confirmed. Initially, the leak was small enough that the ammonia inventory 
and system operations were not in jeopardy. However, the leak began to accelerate to the point 
where troubleshooting and corrective action were vital to the sustainability of the ISS. 
Therefore, it became imperative that the leak be located and repaired for ISS operations to 
continue. No tools were readily available on the ISS to locate such a leak when it was initially 
detected, however NASA engineers were already in the process of developing a new device for 
this purpose called the Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL). The RELL is a robotic 
instrument package with a mass spectrometer and an ion pressure gauge. Initial checkout 
operations with RELL happened to coincide with the increasing leak, and ammonia vapors 
were measured around the P1 EATCS Radiator #3 flexible jumper hoses. The leak stopped 
after the radiator and its flexible hoses were remotely isolated from the loop and the ammonia 
from the isolated segment was vented to space. Astronauts conducted a spacewalk that 
successfully removed the hoses, which were returned to ground for further investigation. The 
purpose of this paper is to review the leak detection and isolation efforts, investigation results, 
lessons learned and the recovery plan. 
Nomenclature 
amu = atomic mass unit 
E =   1x10 
GN2 = Gaseous Nitrogen 
kg = kilogram 
kPa = kilopascals 
lbm = pound mass 
NH3 = Ammonia 
ppm = parts per million 
psia = pound force per square inch 
sccs = standard cubic centimeters per second 
torr = torr 
ATCS = Active Thermal Control System 
ATA = Ammonia Tank Assembly 
DDCU = Direct Current-to-Direct Current Converter Unit  
EATCS = External Active Thermal Control System 
EHDC = External High Definition Camera 
EVA = Extravehicular Activity 
fwd = Forward 
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FOD = Flight Operations Directorate 
HD = High Definition 
IEA = Integrated Equipment Assembly 
ISS = International Space Station 
JSC = Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
LEO = Low Earth Orbit 
LT = Low Temperature 
M&P = Materials and Processes 
MBSU = Main Bus Switching Unit  
MCC = Mission Control Center 
MER = Mission Evaluation Room 
MT = Moderate Temperature 
NASA = National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NTA = Nitrogen Tank Assembly 
ORU = Orbital Replacement Unit  
P1 = Port 1 
PFCS = Pump Flow Control Subassembly  
PVTCS = Photovoltaic Thermal Control System 
QD = Quick Disconnect 
RBVM = Radiator Beam Valve Module 
RELL = Robotic External Leak Locator 
S1 = Starboard 1 
SMAC = Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentration 
SSP = Space Station Program 
TT&E = Test, Teardown and Evaluation  
US = United States 
I. Introduction 
he External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) is a closed loop single phase system that mechanically 
pumps liquid ammonia to cool the avionics, payloads and electronic equipment onboard the International Space 
Station (ISS). There are 2 EATCS located on ISS, one on the starboard side known as S1 or Loop A EATCS, and one 
on the port side known as P1 or Loop B EATCS, as shown in Figure 1. Leaks that develop in these critical cooling 
systems that deplete in-line tanks can ultimately result in loss of cooling which can have devastating impacts to the 
mission, science and crew onboard the ISS. This leakage could be initiated from many causes including but not limited 
to Micro Meteoroid Orbital Debris 
puncturing fluid line(s), seal or valve 
leaks, failure or cracks in welds or other 
components, cyclic loading fatigue after 
many years of operation in orbit, and 
many other causes. The leakage scenario 
discussed in this paper began in 2011 
when a slow ammonia leak was initially 
observed from the P1 EATCS, but later in 
2013 the leak rate began to accelerate. 
The ammonia inventory eventually began 
to decay exponentially, raising concerns 
that the inventory could drop to levels 
where the system would not be 
operational. Troubleshooting options 
included resupplying the ammonia and 
attempting to feed the leak, or attempting to find and stop the leak before ammonia inventory levels reached critical 
limits. Ammonia can be resupplied by replacing the P1 Ammonia Tank Assembly (ATA) with one of two spare ATAs 
located on a stowage platform external to the ISS. This option was not desirable since multiple Extravehicular 
Activities (EVAs) are required, and even once performed that could result in all ammonia inventory in the P1 EATCS 
T 
 
Figure 1.  The International Space Station (ISS). 
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and two spare ATAs potentially being consumed as the leak continued to accelerate. Therefore, to protect the long 
term life of ISS an effort was made to determine the source of the leak and make appropriate repairs. 
 A major hurdle to overcome in achieving this goal was the lack of external ammonia leak detection capabilities on 
the ISS. From the beginning of the ISS Program, NASA had been investigating technologies and techniques to locate 
ammonia leaks outside ISS but the technical challenges has been significant. External coolant leak detection 
technologies were not explored for spacecraft like the Space Shuttle or Apollo Crew and Service Module due to their 
short mission duration (i.e. days to weeks). The EATCS was certified originally for a 15 year life and is expected to 
remain in orbit many years longer than that, and had been leak tight since their activation in 2006. Like a car, the 
possibility of a coolant leak occurring increases as the ISS ages.  Coincidentally, a new experimental tool called the 
Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL) had recently been launched to ISS and was undergoing checkout just prior to 
when the P1 EATCS ammonia leak rate increase became apparent. RELL had the capability to interface with the ISS 
Robotic Arm and scan across the external ammonia systems for measurable concentrations of vaporous ammonia.  
 To the surprise and elation of all involved engineers and management, RELL performed beyond all expectations 
and indeed detected a leak in the P1 EATCS by remotely measuring low level ammonia pressure around two of the 
flexible jumper hose assemblies that connect one of the three deployable radiators. The leak stopped after those two 
hose assemblies, associated lines and the radiator were remotely isolated from the P1 EATCS and the ammonia was 
vented to space. Those two jumper hose assemblies have been in use since the P1 EATCS activation in 2006. It was 
highly desired to remove those jumper hose assembles from the ISS and return them to the ground so NASA could 
perform root cause failure investigation since many more similar fluid jumpers are part of the EATCS. This would 
help to determine if the problem was unique or a fleet issue. The two jumper hose assemblies were successfully 
removed by the crew during the United States (US) EVA, or spacewalk, in March 2018. The two jumper hose 
assembles were returned to the ground and are currently undergoing a root cause failure investigation at NASA. This 
paper discusses the processes involved in detecting and finding the P1 EATCS ammonia leak, the root cause 
investigation and lessons learned.  
II. EATCS Overview 
Each of the two EATCS1 loops contain a Pump Module, an ATA, a Nitrogen Tank Assembly (NTA), three 
deployable radiators, multiple coldplates and heat exchangers, as shown the simplified schematic of Figure 2. Each 
Pump Module circulates liquid ammonia at a constant flowrate to a network of coldplates, heat exchangers, and 
radiators. The ATA consists of two pressure vessels filled with liquid ammonia and gaseous nitrogen separated by a 
collapsible bellows to provide system compliance and supply ammonia to the EATCS. The NTA is connected to the 
ATA and contains a volume of high-pressure nitrogen gas used to regulate the pressure in the EATCS. Ammonia 
 
Figure 2.  S1 and P1 EATCS simplified schematic. 
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supplied to the coldplates and heat exchangers collects heat, which is transferred to the three deployable radiators and 
rejected to space.  
 
 Each deployable radiator contains 2 parallel flow paths and 
each flow path is connected to a Radiator Beam Valve Module 
(RBVM). The RBVM controls ammonia flow to radiators 
including the ability to vent ammonia from a flowpath or isolate 
flow. The ATA, NTA, pump, deployable radiators, RBVM and 
the heat exchangers are Orbital Replacement Units (ORU). This 
means they have the capability of being replaced on-orbit by the 
crew during an EVA. The plumbing in the EATCS consists of 
hard tubing and flexible jumpers. Fluid Quick Disconnects 
(QD) are attached to each ORU to enable connection and 
disconnection (see figure 3), and flexible jumpers and hard 
tubing are used to connect them together. Each Fluid QD 
contains seals to secure the connection and to prevent ammonia 
leaks in both mated and demated conditions.  
III. P1 EATCS Leak Detection and Isolation 
A. Initial Leak Detection  
The NASA and Boeing ATCS teams at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) continuously monitor the 
health of the S1 and P1 EATCS by trending temperatures, pressures, flow rates and ammonia inventory levels. The 
ammonia leak in the P1 EATCS was detected by calculating and plotting the system mass and observing it beginning 
to decay over time, as shown in Figure 4. Ammonia leak rates can then be calculated using a linear least squares curve 
fit of the system mass over a time period. The mass in the closed system that is not leaking should be constant. 
However, there is not sufficient telemetry (i.e. temperature and pressure sensors) in the EATCS to have a robust system 
mass calculation due in part to the massive physical size and distribution of fluid system components. Different parts 
of the system can see different thermal environments in space and those environments can only be estimated.  
 
Figure 3.  Male and Female Quick Disconnects 
(QD). 
 
 
Figure 4.  P1 EATCS Mass Decay over Time. 
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The calculated system mass oscillates due to the ammonia property assumptions made for certain volumes of the 
EATCS. This makes small system changes (i.e. leaks) less apparent, and the teams have to look at long term trends to 
provide a more accurate story of leak rates. Only long term trends (i.e. months to years) are of significance with this 
technique, not near term changes. Furthermore, planned system changes that add or remove significant amounts of 
ammonia create a discontinuity as shown in a system maintenance event in Figure 4.  The planned drain event 
illustrated restarts the calculation after the discontinuity. 
The rate of ammonia leakage was initially not a concern since it was below the EATCS leakage requirement of 7 
lbm/year (3.2 kg/year). Experience has shown that leakage in the 0.5 to 1.5 lbm/year range has been typical of a tight 
system on ISS. The leak in P1 was tracked at a very low rate for several years before it began to accelerate, eventually 
trending towards exponential behavior. In 2016, ground controllers at NASA’s Mission Control Center began 
observing “white flakes”, as shown in Figure 5, from the P1 External High Definition Camera (EHDC) as the leak 
rate approached 30 lbm/year (13.6 kg/year). The P1 EHDC is capable of recording High Definition (HD) video outside 
the ISS. Pressurized liquid ammonia appears to be white and flaky when exposed to a vacuum.  
Though this is the first ammonia leak observed in an EATCS, 
it is the second ammonia leak of this type in the history of the ISS. 
The first ammonia leak on the ISS was from the Photovoltaic 
Thermal Control System (PVTCS) Channel 2B.  PVTCS collects 
and removes heat from each solar array power channel on ISS and 
rejects that heat to space through four separate radiators.  Based on 
the PVTCS Channel 2B history2, the ammonia leak rate that was 
visible to cameras and crew was at a much larger rate of 
approximately 1000 lbm/year (454 kg/year). Earlier analysis and 
laboratory testing of ammonia behavior had shown that, to be 
visible, a leak rate much larger than seen on P1 would be required.  
Therefore, the frequency and amount of white flakes recorded since 
the first observation until the leak stopped was too low and 
sporadic to conclude definitively that they were associated with the 
P1 EATCS leak. Understanding the size and geometry of the white 
flakes could help conclude if they were ammonia or not. However, this could not be accomplished since the 
background of the images for all the white flakes was deep space and the images lack depth perception. 
While watching the white flakes through the P1 EHDC, they appeared to be originating from the P1 EATCS as 
they moved across the screen. However, one of the spare Pump Flow Control Subassembly (PFCS) and a 
decommissioned ammonia system, Z1, were in the same direction of the P1 EATCS relative to the camera, as shown 
in Figure 6. Both the spare PFCS and Z1 contain ammonia and could be contributors to the white flakes if the ammonia 
in those systems began leaking to space. At the time, NASA was unable to rule out those locations as suspects since 
there was a lack of telemetry insight into their ammonia inventory. Thus, the P1 EATCS, the spare PFCS located on 
the ISS US Laboratory Module and Z1 located on top of ISS Node 1 could be the source of the white flakes. Ultimately, 
it could not be determined at the time of the white flakes where they were emanating from. 
 
 
Figure 6.  Location of the P1 EATCS Radiators circled in blue, Z1 and the PFCS circled in red, P1 
EHDC circled in black 
Rad
 
Figure 5.  Photo taken from the P1 EHDC 
pointed to space. “White Flakes” circled in 
red. 
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B. The Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL)  
The decision was made to attempt to locate and stop the leak before the P1 EATCS ammonia inventory would 
reach levels where it would need to be replenished by replacing the ATA. Since the beginning of the ISS Program, 
ammonia leak location involved remotely isolating the 
EATCS into three segments: 1) the ATA, 2) The radiators 
and 3) the Pump Module plus the remainder of the system. 
Operators and engineers at NASA JSC would need to 
monitor the inventory and/or pressure decay following the 
isolation. This could be risky and time consuming especially 
while trying to maintain cooling by keeping the pump 
running. For instance, the radiators would not have thermal 
expansion capabilities while isolated and could result in 
hardware damage due to the thermally induced over pressure 
if not reintegrated into the other segments quickly. 
This approach also was unlikely to isolate the exact leak 
location thus making any potential repair difficult or even 
impossible. To address this, engineers at the NASA JSC and 
Goddard Space Flight Center began developing and building 
the RELL. RELL 
is an instrument 
that can be used in conjunction with the ISS Robotic capabilities to 
remotely detect various gases and measure their pressures in a vacuum, as 
shown in Figure 7. RELL consists of a Residual Gas Analyzer and a Cold 
Cathode Ion Gauge and is capable of detecting molecules up to 100 atomic 
mass units (amu). RELL can measure pressures from standard atmosphere 
to as low as 1E-12 torr, and was certified to be able to detect ammonia leaks3 
from 1E-3 lbm/year (4.5E-4 kg/year) to 1E4 lbm/year (8E3 kg/year). A flight 
ready RELL unit is shown in Figure 8.  
RELL was developed as a technology demonstrator to investigate its 
possible use for leak location. RELL was launched to the ISS in December 
2015 and its capabilities were successfully demonstrated in December 
20164. This planned demonstration test included distinguishing various 
gases from the natural background gasses in low earth orbit (LEO) and 
gathering data to determine if and how it could be used to detect external leaks. During the demonstration scans, RELL 
detected unexpected presence of 
ammonia vapor around the portside of the 
ISS.  Over the course of a few days, RELL 
was remotely operated from the ground to 
scan for possible ammonia vapor sources 
near the P1 EATCS, the spare PFCS and 
Z1.  
RELL detected significant pressure 
readings around the P1 EATCS. The 
spare PFCS and Z1 pressure readings 
were low and in the same order of 
magnitude as what was measured during 
the natural background scans. Though not 
entirely conclusive, these results 
increased the team’s confidence that the 
white flakes were ammonia which had 
originated from the P1 EATCS. RELL 
proceeded to scan locations around the P1 
EATCS that the teams thought could be possible sources of the ammonia leak. This included the Pump Module, the 
ATA and the three radiators. The highest pressure readings were around the P1-3 radiator, and a more close up scan 
measured similar pressures of ammonia in the area of the P1-3-2 RBVM, as shown in Figure 9 also in the dotted 
 
Figure 7.  RELL (circled in red) attached to the ISS 
Robotic Arm in December 2016. 
 
Figure 8. RELL. 
 
Figure 9.  Total pressure versus time of all scans performed on the 
RBVM on the P1-1, P1-2 and P1-3 Radiators. 
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square in figure 2. This pressure was two orders of magnitude larger than the natural background scans. This RBVM 
is one of six located near the three radiator panels on the port side of ISS.  P1-3-2 refers specifically to the third radiator 
on the port side, flowpath number two. 
Because of the success of the first round of remote RELL 
scanning, scans were again performed in the area of the P1-3-2 
RBVM in February 2017, as shown in Figure 10. This included the 
P1-3-2 RBVM itself, the supply and return flexible jumper hose 
assemblies that connect the RBVM to the P1-3 radiator, and the 
supply and return ammonia hard-lines leading up to the RBVM that 
are underneath the jumper hose assemblies. Figure 11 graphically 
shows the RELL scanning grid and a visualization of the pressures 
measured using contour maps. The contour map was colored on a 
range from blue to yellow, with yellow corresponding to higher 
pressures and blue corresponding to lower pressures.  
The port and starboard grids showed the highest pressure in the 
area of the supply and return jumper hose assemblies. However, 
directly underneath those two jumper hoses are supply and return 
ammonia hardlines coming to and from the system. Having hardware 
that is in close proximity or overlapping provides an additional layer 
of uncertainty. The data from these operations along with an understanding of the likelihood of which ammonia lines 
could be leaking, provided strong evidence that the source of the leak was either in the supply or the return flexible 
jumper hose assemblies. The strongest signature was from the radiator return line QD at the junction box of the 
radiator.  The P1 EATCS leak rate at the time RELL completed the final scans was around 50 lbm/year (22.6 kg/year). 
Such an ammonia leak correlated favorably to the pressure readings from RELL based on the distance between RELL 
and the scan area. This gave the teams more confidence that the location of the P1 EATCS ammonia leak had been 
found. 
 
C. The First Spacewalk  
The final RELL scans were very significant steps in efforts to locate and mitigate the source of the P1 EATCS 
ammonia leak. To try to better differentiate between the two flexible jumper hose assemblies and ammonia lines 
underneath them as the source of the leak, the ISS program agreed to have the crew perform a close-up inspection of 
the suspect area during an EVA, in March 2017. This involved the crew performing the following: 
1. Taking HD pictures of the area 
2. Obtaining HD video using an EVA modified GoPro camera 
3. Inspecting and patting down the two P1-3-2 RBVM flexible jumper hose assemblies 
 
Figure 10.  RELL scanning the P1-3 RBVM 
#2 Flexible Jumper Hose Assemblies. 
 
Figure 11.  Pressure contour maps for each of the grid scans performed in February 2017 
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4. Opening the Multilayer Insulation from the ammonia lines underneath the two flexible jumper hose 
assemblies and inspecting the area 
5. Inspecting for any white flakes or other visual evidence 
During the EVA, no white 
flakes were reported by the crew, 
nor were there any other signs that 
implicated either of the two 
flexible jumper hose assemblies 
over the ammonia lines underneath 
them. Figure 12 is a screenshot of 
the footage taken during the EVA 
from the GoPro Camera. However, 
after further review of the GoPro 
HD video following the 
completion of the EVA, the teams 
observed multiple tiny white flakes 
emanating directly from one of the 
two hose assemblies. This was the 
final piece of evidence to have high 
confidence that the leak and the 
source of the white flakes was indeed from one of the two jumper hose assemblies. 
D. Ammonia Venting of the P1-3 Radiator Flow Path #2 
With the source of the P1 EATCS ammonia leak having been narrowed down to the two jumper hoses connecting 
the P1-3 radiator to the P1-3-2 RBVM the NASA JSC Engineering and Operations teams decided to isolate the hose 
assemblies flowpaths from the rest of 
the system to stop the leak. To achieve 
this, the P1-3-2 RBVM would have to 
be remotely actuated, which would 
isolate one of the two ammonia flow 
paths in the P1-3 radiator and the two 
jumper hose assemblies. However, just 
closing the P1-3-2 RBVM would result 
in the isolated segment becoming 
hydrostatically locked.  
In this configuration, extremely hot 
or cold environmental temperatures 
could cause hardware damage to the 
P1-3 radiator or the two jumper hose 
assemblies. To manage this risk, the 
RBVMs are designed to vent the 
ammonia in the P1-3 radiator Flow Path 
#2 and the two flexible jumper hose 
assemblies. Following the vent, the 
suspected leaking flexible jumper hose 
assemblies would be isolated, and the mass remaining in the rest of the P1 EATCS would be monitored to determine 
if the mass continued to decline or if the leak had ceased. 
An ammonia venting analysis was performed to determine the amount of time the P1-3-2 RBVM would need to 
remain in the vent position to ensure all the ammonia was evacuated5. The results concluded that the RBVM should 
remain in the vent position for no less than one hour, but the teams recommended to leave it in the vent position for 
no less than 24 hours for conservatism. The ammonia venting operation occurred in May 2017. Figure 13 is a 
screenshot of the video recorded from the ammonia venting operation. The actual time that the RBVM remained in 
the vent positon was around 22 hours before it was closed. The vast majority of ammonia quantity vented in the first 
15 minutes. 
 
Figure 13.  Ammonia vent of the P1-3 Radiator Flow Path #2. Ammonia 
particles and the RBVM are circled in red. 
 
Figure 12.  A screenshot from the EVA GoPo during the inspection of the 
P1-3-2 RBVM Supply and Return Flexible Jumpers. 
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E. Verification that the Ammonia Leak has been Found and Stopped 
The teams had to wait several weeks to determine if the P1 EATCS ammonia leak had stopped after the ammonia 
venting and isolation of the P1-3 radiator hoses. This was due to the uncertainty and assumptions made to calculate 
an ammonia leak rate as mentioned earlier. After a few months following the P1-3-2 RBVM closure, the teams were 
confident that the ammonia leak had stopped since the mass was holding steady, as shown on the right side of Figure 
4. In addition, no white flakes have been observed from the P1 cameras since the closure of the RBVM. This is 
partially due to limited frequency of the use of P1 cameras, but no white flakes have been observed while in use. As 
desired, no further troubleshooting actions were necessary (i.e. ammonia resupply by replacing the ATA) since the P1 
EATCS ammonia inventory has remained above limits.  For the first time in the history of the ISS or any other US 
space effort, a cooling system leak had been detected and located using new leak location technology of the RELL, 
and then isolated and shown to be stopped – with the vast majority of the effort conducted remotely from the ground! 
F. Returning the Flexible Jumper Hose Assemblies to the Ground 
Though the P1 EATCS ammonia leak had stopped, it was highly desired to remove the two flexible jumper hose 
assemblies and return them to undergo Test, Teardown and Evaluation (TT&E) to determine the root cause of the 
leak. Ultimately, the desire would be to replace the hoses with new or repaired hardware so that the flowpath of the 
radiator could be regained.  The two flexible jumper hose assemblies have the capability of being removed by the 
crew during an EVA. Therefore, the teams proposed that their removal be performed in an upcoming EVA and 
subsequently brought inside the ISS to be returned on a future cargo vehicle.  
Bringing the two hose assemblies inside the ISS posed a potential risk of harming the crew if sufficient amounts 
of ammonia remained in the two hoses after the vent and then escaped into the ISS atmosphere. NASA and Boeing 
engineers at JSC were confident that all the ammonia in the two flexible jumper hose assemblies except for a minor 
trace amount had been vented to space. However, these trace amounts could not be neglected due to the hazards 
associated with bringing ammonia into the pressurized volume of the ISS. There are small volumes inside the two 
hose assemblies where traces of ammonia vapors could theoretically be trapped.  
Each end of the jumper hose assemblies have QDs, and these QDs each have primary and secondary seals against 
leakage. The volumes between the primary and secondary spool seals are in hydraulic connection with the ammonia 
when the QDs are connected and open. The potential for one or more hydraulically locked volumes occurs when the 
QDs on the two hose assemblies were closed during the EVA potentially trapping residual ammonia between the 
primary and secondary spool seals.  
An assessment was performed to determine the maximum amount of ammonia that could exist between the primary 
and secondary spool seals in the QDs on both the supply and return hose assemblies. The Spacecraft Maximum 
Allowable Concentration6 (SMAC) of vaporous ammonia allowed in the ISS pressurized modules is 30 ppm. The 
assessment concluded that the worst case possible amount of trapped ammonia could result in 12 ppm in the smaller 
airlock space in the ISS only if all four QDs’ trapped volumes were filled with liquid ammonia and all four then 
spontaneously released that ammonia in the airlock at the same time. This is below the 30 ppm SMAC limit and an 
acceptable risk due to the exceedingly small likelihood of actually occurring.   
To ensure confidence that the two flexible jumper hose assemblies were indeed vented of ammonia in addition to 
what could be trapped in the QD, it was recommended that a second vent be performed no later than a week prior to 
the EVA. The P1-3-2 RBVM would remain in the vent position for the entire week leading up to the EVA. With this 
plan, the ISS Program approved having the two hose assemblies removed on the next EVA so they could be returned 
to ground for TT&E. The two jumper hose assemblies were successfully removed during an EVA in March 2018 with 
no issues, and then returned to the ground later that year and delivered to NASA and Boeing for TT&E. 
IV. TT&E of the two Flexible Jumper Hose Assemblies  
 The first step in the TT&E was to conduct a visual survey of the two flexible jumper hose assemblies. For the 
supply hose assembly, there were no signs of structural issues for the jumper hose itself. The two QDs on each end of 
the supply hose assembly appeared almost pristine, as shown in Figure 15. However, this cannot be said for the return 
flexible jumper hose assembly. Though no structural issues were observed for the jumper hose itself, there was 
noticeable brown colored residue found on the secondary spool seals on both QDs, as shown in Figure 16. This was 
observed on the visible exposed seals, however the aft primary and secondary spool seals located on the aft end of 
each QD cannot be observed without disassembly. 
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A sample of the residue was taken and sent to a Materials and Processes (M&P) lab where detailed examination 
could be conducted. Lab results revealed the material consisted of 
non-volatile residue (NVR) which included silicone grease 
classified as polydimethylsiloxane, and many other compounds 
typically found in NVR for systems of this nature. While the 
ammonia used in the EATCS is certified to a 99.998% purity, the 
amount of NVR found in the sample was consistent with the 
amount that is allowed in ammonia. When ammonia leaks through 
seals or other interfaces into the vacuum of space and changes 
phases from liquid to gas, the NVR is typically left behind at the 
leak site. The larger quantity of residue found in these QDs 
indicated the possibility of their role in the P1 EATCS leak, but 
were not a conclusive indicator of the prime leak site.  
The next phase of TT&E was to perform accumulation bag leak tests on both the supply and return flexible jumper 
hose assemblies. This involved bagging the hose and the QDs separately using a procedure where accumulated helium 
inside sealed bags can be compared to standard calibrated leaks to yield 
true indicated leak values for each isolated section. A leak rate can then 
be measured and compared to the leakage requirement of 1E-4 sccs of 
Helium at 500 psia (3447 kPa) and standard atmospheric temperature. 
The supply jumper hose assembly barely failed the leakage requirement 
at 1.4E-4 sccs of Helium @ 500 psia. However, the return hose assembly 
significantly failed the leakage requirement. QD F140 (connected to the 
RBVM) failed the leakage requirement at 2.8E-3 sccs of Helium at 
500psia. QD F128 (connected to the radiator) failed the leakage 
requirement at 1.91 sccs of Helium at 500 psia (3447 kPa). This was 
believed to be the same order of magnitude leak rate that was calculated from the P1 EATCS before the leak stopped 
upon closure of the P1-3-2 RBVM. 
An additional bagged leak test was performed on the QD F128 to determine if the front or aft end of the QD was 
the leak source since there are multiple seals and multiple leak locations within a QD. The forward half of the QD 
F128 failed the leakage requirement at 2.2E-1 sccs of Helium at 500 psia and the aft half failed at 0.5 sccs of Helium 
@ 500 psia. This suggested that the primary and secondary aft spool seals were the major source of the P1 EATCS 
leak. This was surprising since such a leak had never been observed on aft seals, or any other continuously sliding 
seal. Inspection of the primary and secondary aft spool seals could not be performed without disassembly. Therefore, 
disassembly of QD F128 and QD F140 and evaluation of the aft spool seals would help determine the root cause of 
the seal failure and any remedial actions. 
This failure investigation of the removed failed QDs from the return hose assembly is currently underway, and 
results from this aspect of the effort are expected to yield important information as to what the future might hold for 
similar leaks on ISS. 
The results of the QD F128 failure investigation could, at minimum, 
result in the following: 
1. Determine if the failure was unique or if this is a leading indicator 
of a fleet issue. 
2. Determine if the failure on QD F128 could have compromised its 
Male QD counterpart located on the P1-3 radiator still on ISS. 
3. Identify possible design changes to QDs for future applications. 
4. Reassessment of the current sparing posture of these types of QDs 
and jumpers  
Disassembly of the failed QDs took place with the help of the 
hardware vendor in March 2019, and initial indications are that the 
suspect aft spool seals were indeed responsible for the majority of the 
leakage experienced on ISS.  A significant quantity of brown deposits, 
as shown in figure 17, were seen just down-stream of the enclosed aft 
seals and further analysis of the deposits and examination of surfaces 
is planned in the near future.  Details on this analysis and more discussion of how those results might impact future 
operations on ISS are expected to be the subject of a follow-on paper. 
 
Figure 15.  Supply Hose Assembly QD 
Forward Secondary Seal. 
 
Figure 16.  Return Hose Assembly QD 
Forward Secondary Seal. 
 
Figure 17.  Return Flexible Jumper 
Assembly QD Aft Spool Seals. 
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V. Lessons Learn and P1 EATCS Recovery 
 After many years of planning to deal with ammonia leakage on ISS where specific leak location is not known, the 
P1 EATCS leak has given the technical teams an opportunity to try out and explore various approaches.  RELL was 
added to the ISS toolset just in time to be instrumental in the detection of such external ammonia leaks. Future external 
leak troubleshooting steps and procedures will include the use of RELL to even a greater degree based on experiences 
gained recently in its use. A second RELL has been built and was successfully launched to the ISS in April 2019, 
which adds redundancy to leak location abilities. In addition, an external stowage platform for RELL is being built 
now and is to launch in early 2020 that will enable both RELL units to remain outside where they can quickly be 
accessed for use in leak location activities without involving the crew or airlock resources. 
To regain full capacity of the P1 EATCS radiator heat rejection system on ISS, it was highly desired to obtain 
replacement hose assemblies and get them relaunched to ISS sooner rather than later. The ISS Program approved the 
refurbishment of both jumper assemblies that were returned from ISS.  For the supply hose assembly, refurbishment 
was fairly straightforward since it was basically in pristine condition and only needed retest and leakage verification 
prior to relaunch to the ISS. For the return path jumper hose, the QDs from both ends were removed and replaced with 
new QDs, but the jumper hose itself was cleared to be reused as-is. Both refurbished hoses were launched in April 
2019 and are planned to be reinstalled via EVA in 2020.  Assuming reinstallation goes well and no additional problems 
are experienced, it is hoped that this will regain the use of the additional cooling capacity of the P1-3-2 radiator flow 
path. 
VI. Summary 
This paper discusses the P1 External Active Thermal Control System (EATCS) ammonia leak that was initially 
identified on the International Space Station (ISS) around 2011. The rate of ammonia leakage was initially not a 
concern since it was below the system leakage requirement of 7 lbm/year (3.2 kg/year), but the eventual rate of increase 
was concerning and it later reached almost 101 lbm/year (46 kg/year) before the leak was stopped by isolation. The 
Robotic External Leak Locator (RELL) was built and launched to the ISS to detect and help locate ammonia leaks 
using the ISS Robotic Arm and remote ground operator control without constant crew involvement. RELL pinpointed 
the ammonia leak to the two flexible jumper hose assemblies connecting the P1-3 deployable radiator to the P1 EATCS 
via the P1-3-2 Radiator Beam Valve Module. The ammonia inside the two hose assemblies and the P1-3 Radiator 
Flow Path #2 was isolated and vented to space in 2017. This stopped the leak and an Extravehicular Activity was 
conducted to remove the two flexible jumper hose assemblies so they could be returned to ground for further Test, 
Teardown and Evaluation.  
After the two hose assemblers were returned, it was determined that one out of the two Quick Disconnects (QD) 
located on the return hose assembly was the major source of the P1 EATCS ammonia leak. Both QDs were found to 
contain significant brown deposits believed to be non-volatile residue from the ammonia leaking through them. The 
root cause of the ammonia leak in that QD is still unknown as the failure investigation is still ongoing. Both jumper 
hose assemblies have been refurbished, relaunched to ISS, and are currently stored inside awaiting an upcoming EVA 
opportunity to be reinstalled. Results from the root cause failure investigation may have significant impacts on ISS 
operations and are expected to be published in a later paper. 
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